Catherine A. Fitzpatrick
CAF via Bing Image Creator
I've rounded up a lot of my scattered thoughts and memories of the OSCE process over the years — and have some more still to do — but now I'm considering seriously whether OSCE should even go on existing.
I may have lapsed in my attention to OSCE because I feel the war in Ukraine and suffering of civilians there, and the plight of Russian political prisoners, totally eclipse the creaking old special mechanisms and committees and follow-up meetings and seminars of an international body. Only military, economic, and political assistant to Ukraine, making it militarily, economically, and politically untenable for Russia to keep warring against Ukraine, is going to be effective and has been effective to some extent this far to reduce and stop the war.
OSCE Survives, Still a Beacon for NGOs
Yet plenty of people are still involved in OSCE and I see some familiar faces of colleagues I have known for a good share of these 50 years who keep struggling and have come to Finland, where the anniversary meetings are in session now. The non-governmental Civic Solidarity group has a manifesto for people to sign — it's telling that it's mainly people in "the East" who are signing. I personally feel that this sort of "civil society" thinking and writing is totally ineffective regarding warfare in Ukraine and if I were running an NGO now, I would find it hard to justify for an American organization especially to drop $3000 on a trip to Warsaw or Helsinki and back, instead of, say, on a field office in Ukraine — although there are already plenty of earnest aid workers and human rights advocates cris-crossing their muddy footprints even by the frontline in Ukraine. Yes, I suppose, as Churchill said, "jaw jaw is better than war war" — except there already is a war of now 11 years duration in Ukraine, not to mention Russia's wars against its own people and its wars in Syria and even Africa. Still, I suppose it's important that there still are people willing to trudge to these OSCE gatherings because they or rather the people and issues they represent are truly "what Helsinki is all about".
Relic or Relevant?
Amb. Ian Bond, a veteran British diplomat currently serving as deputy director of the Centre for European Reform has the best explainer for the Helsinki 50th anniversary on why OSCE should be kept going, asking whether it is a "relic" or "relevant"— and why we have to think of life after the war in Ukraine (someday) and beyond the logjam with Russian now.
In recent years, as OSCE has occasionally come up as a topic among colleagues and friends, I would ask why we couldn't work toward suspending Russia from OSCE. This kind of suspension is impossible at the UN, but there is the precedent of the Council of Europe starting the process to suspend Russia for failing to fulfill its pledges upon acceptance for membership and violating European principles of human rights — Russia responded by withdrawing first.
No Consensus to Boot Russia
I would always say there was the precedent in 1991 of OSCE's suspension of the former Yugoslavia — that is, Serbia and Montenegro — but the conversation would never go farther as there seemed to be no "coalition of the willing" to even consider this re: Russia among states.
As Amb. Bond explains, you will never get this configuration now.
Since suspending Russia from the OSCE would require consensus minus Russia itself, it wouldn’t happen anyway. But we will eventually, after Russia’s war against Ukraine ends, need to find a way to manage an adversarial relationship with Moscow (I suspect), and that’s what the Helsinki Final Act was designed to do. Hopefully we can preserve the principles of the HFA, even if we can’t save the OSCE as an organisation.
When I pressed this question on Facebook, then Ian reminded me that you did get Russia to play along re: its ally Serbia/Montenegro but now, as he explain the cold facts:
Yugoslavia’s suspension was the last hurrah of East-West co-operation in the OSCE. Now, Russia could count on Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, most if not all Central Asian states and probably Hungary and Slovakia.
At the time, in 1991 after the failed coup and the beginning of the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was reforming. While Serbia/Montenegro were close allies, for whatever reasons, Moscow decided not to mess up this particular popular "Consensus Minus 1" — and didn't.
Notice the West European states never discuss this or threaten it re: Russia today — and I'm not sure their own coalition is shored up as well as it could be. Europe is always divided on how to deal with Russia.
So expulsion — basically a rhetorical and symbolic gesture that wouldn't lead to the end of the war in any event — is out. Truly, the focus should be getting Russian tanks and troops physically out of Ukraine, not getting Russia out of OSCE which won't make a difference.
OSCE Hamstrung
Here is the stalemate of OSCE in a nutshell, from Amb. Bond's explainer:
The OSCE is hamstrung by the fact that, with few exceptions, decisions can only be taken by consensus, and there are no means to compel a participating state to comply with its obligations. There are mechanisms to allow groups of states to appoint an expert rapporteur to investigate “a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment” of OSCE human rights commitments; and one or more states may request another state to explain unusual military activity, or to accept an inspection of a defined area of its territory where suspect military activity is taking place. But in recent years, Russia has refused to engage with rapporteurs investigating human rights violations in occupied areas of Ukraine, or to allow inspections of military activity.
I was present at the birth of the "Moscow Mechanism" as it was called for years, proposed by Sergei Kovalev, made head of the Russian delegation to CSCE in Moscow in those promising days after the coup: to enable states to request the entry of a rapporteur to exam allegations of severe human rights allegations. It is hard to use it practically nowadays.
We cannot just blame the recalcitrance of Moscow and its allies and oppressive countries even sometimes distancing themselves from Moscow like Kazakhan. Says Amb. Bond:
The West, however, and especially the Europeans, have done less than they could have done to show that they value the organisation. When the Russians accuse the OSCE of double standards, they are not entirely wrong. Western intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was morally justifiable, but hardly respected the Helsinki principles. When tensions arose in the post-communist space, Western countries were keen to get the OSCE involved in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction; when they arose in Western Europe, they kept it out. For example, the UK and Ireland worked together and with other EU member-states to exclude any OSCE role in relation to Northern Ireland, even though in some cases the expertise of the OSCE institutions might have been useful. While the UK and US were keen on sending OSCE election observers to former Soviet states and ensuring that they got to see as much as possible of every stage of the electoral process, their own legislation made it difficult or impossible for observers to get similar levels of access. And above all, as the EU enlarged, it shielded candidates as well as member-states from OSCE scrutiny other than election monitoring. However specious Russian arguments about the human rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia were, the EU’s support for the closure of the OSCE missions in the two couns in the two countries in 2001 fed Russia’s narrative that the OSCE treated some countries more leniently than others.
In a world where Russia massacred hundreds of thousands of Chechens and their own Russian retirees in Grozny in two wars — for starters — it's hard to feel as if Baltic language requirements of permanent Russian settlers are unfair, but the Baltic capitals might have allowed these missions to go on working (they were staffed by genuine monitors, including from the US, and not merely Russian plants) even if Russia's motives were insincere — to deprive Russia of its rhetorical warfare on this score.
Reciprocity
As for the US, the reference here to monitoring in the US is likely related to the fact that federal governments can't force state officials to do things during elections, or so it seems. If there are local laws against loitering around polls and prohibiting electioneering 200 feet from polls etc then monitors aren't welcome inside a polling station — or so it seems. It seems to me you could still do a lot to monitor US elections even with local obstacles but…is this the best use of OSCE's resources when some countries don't have contested elections at all?
I recall one such mission as basically turning into a circus, with a lot of politicking and posturing by US groups and OSCE at the time and hollers that OSCE would be prosecuted. Bosh.
These are controversial issues to this day, as certain conflicts are decided by the powers-that-be to be treated either at the UN — New York or Geneva or by the EU itself or by various figures like Marti Ahtisaari using their "good offices".
OSCE has never been an effective venue to tackle US human rights violations but then — NGOs have the courts and Congress for that in the US itself. Kyiv could say the same thing about the recent kerfluffle over the disbanding — and then reconstitution — of independent anti-corruption bodies in Ukraine. Leave us alone, we'll do the things. Except there has always been a notion, very hard-wired in Helsinki follow-up agreements that raising human rights problems and non-compliance with the Accords is not "interference in internal affairs." It is more than fine to take an interest in the welfare of people in another country, based on universal principles in international agreements which all the governments in question signed and by which they are bound.
The rapporteurs for places like Belarus generally have to write their reports in their capitals by interviewing Belarusian emigres and the list of closed/blocked mission tells the obvious story. Missions were really both a strength and a weakness for OSCE (I spent a good part of my life in the 1990s pestering Amb. Hans-Georg Wieck, the head of the OSCE in Belarus whom I felt was too inactive and cosy with the regime). Sometimes you felt they did really important work no one else could do. Sometimes you felt like somebody in a mission was helping his brother-in-law in Turkey to get a construction contract.
Western Reluctance
One day in the early 2000s in Vienna after one of these interminable OSCE meetings reviewing and analyzing the work of missions, I didn't hesitate to march right up to Amb. Benita Ferrero-Waldner then foreign minister of Austria and ask her why her country (I believe Austria was in the chair then) let the Russian force the OSCE mission in Chechnya to fold.
I will never forget her simple answer as she gazed at me with her deep brown eyes:
"The great powers do not wish it."
Note what she said.
The "great powers" PLURAL. Not just Russia — that was too obvious. But the US did not fight for preservation of the OSCE mission in Chechnya; more to the point,Germany or France or England didn't fight for it. Why? Because they wanted to accommodate Russia on a point re: terrorists in Chechnya especially after 9/11. They "needed Russia for other things". (This idea of "needing countries for other things," i.e. their vote on this or that pet project or urgent issue for some other country was a constant refrain we would hear particularly at the UN.) There wasn't appetitite for it. Chechnya was a place no American wanted to go to especially after Fred Cuny, the humanitarian aid expert, was killed there in 1995.
I don't have to explain how hot and cold the US has blown on helping Ukraine defend itself, particularly in this last year with the Trump Administration.
OSCE — Framework for Justice and Peace
When — not if — Russia collapses and begins to fall into pieces (as did the Soviet Union, although incompletely), there should be a framework to sort out the "Justice" as well as "Truth and Reconciliation" pieces and solve the grievances that some of the constituents have with each other. There have been a number of conferences on these issues at Jamestown and elsewhere. Paul Goble, an expert on "the nationalities" all these years still publishing his "Window on Eurasia" has spoken persuasively and eloquently about how the Western powers need to be planning for this breakup now and forming relationships with the independence movements but also not to have illusions about how all this will go.
A Marshall Plan will be needed — except, the original Marshall Plan came after there was a defeated Nazi Germany and its Axis and a victorious Allies. We do not have that yet. It might be beneficial to have OSCE as a framework although the Council of Europe may pretend to that role. Probably you'll need every public and private agency you can interest in this problem to achieve anything — and it is really hard to interest foundations in Russian or any other type of former Soviet emigre sustanence as they are perceived as ineffectual, compromised by Russian intelligence, and warring among themselves. You know, like the Democratic Party of the US.
Real Achievements and Hope
Interestingly, another Helsinki legend, Orest Deychakiwsky, a Ukrainian by heritage who served for decades on the US Commission on Securty and Cooperation in Europe, in contemplating the achievements of the past 50 years, and despite the war in Ukraine, doesn't call for dismantling or ignoring the OSCE. He acknowledges that it is severely hobbled, but concludes on a hopeful note:
Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, the Helsinki process (CSCE) successfully adapted to the post-Cold War environment, becoming the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). With the creation of many new states, the organization’s membership expanded from 35 to 57 countries. The OSCE has become the largest regional organization in the world, promoting security, democracy and various forms of cooperation in a myriad of constructive ways for the last three decades.
Unfortunately, the OSCE is now in turmoil, and its ability to help maintain the rules-based international order is in question.
This in large part is due to Moscow’s worsening obstructionism of the OSCE. But the primary factor is Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, which violates every single one of the OSCE’s 10 core principles enshrined in the Final Act, and which the vast majority of the 57 OSCE countries resolutely condemn. Indeed, Ukrainians are literally on the front lines fighting for these Helsinki principles.
Irrespective of what OSCE’s future holds, there is no doubt that the Final Act marked a turning point in the advancement of human rights and freedom. Russian President Vladimir Putin, who is accused of committing war crimes, is doing his best to reverse historic transformations that the Final Act expedited and to restore the Soviet/Russian empire. Ultimately, he will fail, and the noble goals of peace, freedom and human dignity embodied in the Helsinki Final Act will prevail.
"Time heals all wounds/the patient is not there" — these noble goals will not prevail in our lifetime surely. But…"time wounds all heels"?
What Can OSCE Do Now Practically?
I think while the Ukrainian war is causing "turmoil" if not ennervating impotence at this impasse, there is still the possibility for all the various offices of the OSCE to keep the record, to begin to prepare for the reconstruction after the war, to come to the defense and aid of NGOs in Ukraine and more — such as very practical work like protecting civilians from mines using robots.
Maybe there is an opportunity now to focus on Central Asian countries in OSCE, given their continued involvement and Russia losing its grip over them (which China taking its place, however). At the General Assembly, some former or usual Russian allies who had voted against the resolution to condemn the invasion of Ukraine and urge Russia to leave, including Kazakhstan, have later abstained on the votes. Maybe there is some room to maneuver here, I am not sufficiently briefed.
OSCE has also taken up the "fake news" issue which is entirely in its wheelhouse but there are many talk shops already in existence on this topic with not much effect.
I imagine now, as then there is an enormous amount of boondoggling that goes on at OSCE — and now without US help and involvement tragically — but much good still being done, if rather specialized, dull, and quiet.
Somebody has to get involved in elections in Mongolia even if most people are happy enough with the Mongolian leader getting on Twitter and saying that unlike Russia, his country is not going to try to reclaim their historic territory gained by the Mongolian Hordes.
Training journalists in Uzbekistan, where they have been jailed for their work, is only a good thing, mainly for the "prescence" and "connection" features of such exercises because then someone is watching what happens to them.
Truly, these meetings and their formal subjects are not always the point: the point is to bring people with information from the field to those in capitals in a position to make decisions to change situations.
Starfishes
Prof. Peter Juviler, an expert on the Soviet Union and human rights at Barnard College, once said in, introducing me to speak at a lecture, that human rights work was like going around picking up starfishes stranded on the beach, and then throwing them back into the sea. It all seemed pretty inefffectual and pointless.
"But it matters to the starfish," he added.
Like my past colleagues, I look forward to the day when the US is a "normal country" again involved in international bodies effectively, and helping other countries to become normal. Ultimately, it will matter to the beach and the sea as well.









